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Abstract: The transition to democracy in 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe is said to be 
the achievement of the dissident sector. In Poland the biggest power in the democratization 
process was the Solidarność trade union. At the same time many smaller grassroots groups 
from that  time  remain  unnoticed  and  their  influence  on  the  democratization  process  is 
underrated.  Such  grassroots  groups  were  responsible  for  organizing  numerous  strikes, 
campaigns on the issues of environmental protection and many others. They also brought 
novel protest repertoires and managed to mobilize different sectors of the society. This paper 
aims at presenting the complex environment of civil society actors in the democratization of 
Poland as well as presents the broader context for the transformation of 1989: structural 
preconditions, cleavages within the authorities and main waves of protest events.
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Introduction
Poland’s transition from communist regime to democracy in 1989 is often cited 
as the most important event in the country’s modern history. Despite its political 
significance,  the  transformation engaged large sectors  of  civil  society  and a 
broad spectrum of grassroots social movements and groups. This paper presents 
the dynamics of the protests as well as the complexity of the dissident sector in 
1980s Poland. In particular it focuses on the role of civil society and grassroots 
groups in the process of transformation, and the main frames and protest events 
of  the period.  Ethnic,  religious and economic dimensions of  political  life  in 
communist Poland are also taken into account.
Transition: periodization/s
It is very difficult to pinpoint the beginning of the transition period. Some may 
point  to  the  first  cracks  within  the  communist  system after  the  uprising  in 
Poznań in 1956. For instance,  Maryjane Osa (2008) shows the continuity of 
networks of Polish opposition from the late 1950s and the milieus of Catholic 
journals Więź and Znak. She recalls that later “in 1967 a group of students at the 
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University of Warsaw, called 'commandos', organized political discussions and 
'political  salons'.  Initially,  its  activities  were  confined  to  matters  of  the 
university.  They  tried  to  change  the  official  that  is  controlled  by  the 
communists,  student  organizations  into  an  independent  association.  Students 
also were leaning towards to the youth culture of the sixties. Their relationship 
to the student movement in France and West Germany was a positive, and the 
attempt made by the Czechoslovak students to democratize socialism received 
enthusiastic  reception”  (Osa  2008:  223).  Protests  organized  by  the  students 
(among  which  were  the  future  leaders  of  the  democratic  opposition,  Adam 
Michnik and Jacek Kuroń) spread to the biggest academic centers in Poland and 
lasted several weeks in 1968. 
However, the most commonly cited turning point is the founding of the 
Komitet  Obrony  Robotników (KOR,  Committee  for  Workers’ Defense)  that 
later transformed into the Solidarność [Solidarity] movement. KOR, established 
in 1976, brought together the intelligentsia and the workers, initially as a means 
to provide legal aid for the leaders of protests in an Ursus tractor factory and in 
Radom  in  1976.  Structures  established  at  that  time  evolved  into  a  larger, 
countrywide network of dissidents and workers. Most observers claim that the 
legalization  of  Solidarność  as  a  trade  union  (in  November  1980)  and  the 
introduction of martial law (December 13, 1981) marked the beginning of the 
transformation period. The registration of Solidarność as an independent trade 
union was preceded by huge waves of strikes, including general strikes. The 
former undermined the state’s monopoly on organizations and the representation 
of workers, the latter signified the regime’s helplessness when confronted with 
social mobilization. The time in between is often referred to as the ‘Carnival of 
Solidarność’ (Kenney 2002, Ost 1990). On 11 September 1986 interior minister 
Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak announced the release of all "non-criminal prisoners" 
(around 300 people) still in prison even after the ‘general’ amnesty of 1984. The 
September 1986 amnesty was announced in the act of 17 July 1986. Initially, 
opposition activists  approached the act  with great  caution,  suspecting that  it 
would concern at best only a small part of the prisoners. The fate of political 
prisoners  during  this  period  was  the  main  obstacle  in  relations  with  the 
government,  ruling  out  the  possibility  of  any  negotiation.  The  size  of  the 
amnesty surprised the opposition leaders. Among others, Bogdan Borusewicz, 
Henryk Wujec, Leszek Moczulski and Władysław Frasyniuk were released from 
prison. The most impressive, however, was the release of Zbigniew Bujak, the 
legendary leader of the underground "Solidarity" who had been arrested in May 
1986 after nearly five years in hiding from the secret  service,  and who was 
portrayed as an arch enemy of the socialist state in official propaganda.
By the end of the 1980s the communist regime embarked on a round of 
negotiations with the opposition later known as the Round Table negotiations. 
Meetings, held in Belvedere, the presidential palace,  were supposed to bring 
about  a  peaceful  transition  and democratization  of  communist  Poland:  “The 
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deliberations of the Round Table ended on April 5 [1989] and agreement was 
reached  on  some  important  matters.  The  most  important  of  them,  the  re-
legalization  of  Solidarity,  the  authorization  to  publish  the  weekly  and  daily 
journals,  and  the  announcement  of  a  semi-free  elections  to  the  parliament 
(including free elections for the Senate) on 4 June [1989]” (Kenney 2005: 301). 
Soon  after  the  elections  a  former  dissident,  Tadeusz  Mazowiecki,  was 
nominated the first non-communist prime minister in Poland of the period after 
1945. At the same time general Wojciech Jaruzelski became the president, this 
position having been restored (the previous president, Bolesław Bierut, had died 
during a visit in Moscow in 1953, and there had been no president in office 
since then, the most important political figure being the first secretary of the 
Polish communist party). 
Some observers stressed the symbolic meaning of the evacuation of the 
Soviet Red Army in 1993. However many of the processes initiated with the 
1989  transition  continued  for  much  longer.  Some (especially  amongst  those 
holding right-wing political views) even claim that the post-socialist phase was 
in  fact  a  continuation  of  the  former  regime  through  informal  networks  and 
business alliances (cf. Staniszkis 2005).
Protest
The 1989 transition was not a turbulent time when compared with the wave of 
strikes of 1980 and the military and police interventions during martial law in 
1981. In 1980 “Proponents of the strike [the end of August 1980] opposed to the 
unfair and incompetent - in their opinion - regime a sense of dignity and moral 
values of the workers, putting forth a request for a re-evaluation of their status 
and the status of  the whole society” (Barker 2008: 274).  By the end of  the 
decade most of the dissidents were in favor of negotiations and compromise 
with the authorities. As Padraic Kenney writes: “The strikes [of 1988] differed 
significantly from those of 1980. They did not spread to many sites, nor did they 
have  much  support  among  the  local  population”  (Kenney  2005:  261).  The 
strikes of the two waves in 1988 (in May and August) were often organized by 
grassroots committees and smaller groups that did not belong to the mainstream 
opposition.
The so-called ‘constructive  opposition’ (as  opposed to  the  ‘konkretny’ 
activists  from  grassroots  organizations,  cf.  Kenney  2002:  172)  aimed  at  a 
peaceful  transition.  Rafał  Górski  writes  that:  “between  the  years  1983-88 
numbers of demonstrators were in decline. It was a result of the attitude of the 
underground leadership of Solidarity, which sought to limit the scale of anti-
government speeches in fear of the victims. Another factor was the growing 
public apathy, which have already pushed some of the activists of ‘Solidarity’ to 
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desperate  acts1”.  Jany  Waluszko,  who  began  his  activism in  Gdańsk  in  the 
1980s, describes the situation in a similar way. He writes that: “Strikes in 1988 
were sluggish and did not have the support not only the general public, but even 
among the ‘Solidarity’ activists. Radical groups of young people had to drag 
Wałęsa to them and he just went for it when he realized that it would give him 
the advantage in bargaining with the authorities.  Only a few plants (and the 
University of Gdansk) were on strike, and there were almost as many people 
from outside as the crew on strike - almost all  young, not always positively 
related to the authorities of ‘Solidarity’, active mainly on the street (with the use 
of violence and without)2”. There was in fact fear that public manifestations of 
discontent could jeopardize these efforts and start a new cycle of confrontation. 
(Ackerman and du Vall 2001, Ost 2005). To avoid confrontation, a series of 
meetings  was  held  which  acquired  the  name  of  Round  Table  (most  of  the 
meetings  were  in  fact  held  at  a  round  table  in  the  Presidential  Palace  in 
Warsaw). Even though the Solidarność camp had the capabilities to organize a 
strike, most were called by more radical groups (often anarchists, nationalists 
etc. or locally organized workers’ committees).
The widespread aspiration was for a peaceful systemic transition, with the 
introduction of democratic institutions in Poland. One of the key elements to be 
achieved was the introduction of party pluralism, to be gained with the first 
semi-free elections: “According to the agreement reached at the Round Table on 
April 9 Solidarity was allowed to nominate candidates for 161 seats - 35 percent 
- and for all 100 seats in the Senate” (Kenney 2005: 308). For the opposition, 
this was a disappointment in addition to an unimaginable amount of work to be 
done. After this election came another disappointment - election turnout was 
62%. Demands by the opposition included the freedom of assembly and the 
right to self-organization. The abolition of the censorship office was another of 
the central claims that would result in freedom of speech and publication. This 
was  accompanied  by  claims  for  the  right  to  protest.  Other  topics  included 
market reforms (transition from the centrally planned economy to a free market) 
and  an  institutional  shift  in  public  administration  that  would  remove  the 
monopoly of the communist party (Garlicki 2004). 
The  Round  Table  negotiations  were  divided  into  several  sub-sections, 
each dealing with a prioritized topic. The top officials of the communist party 
began to negotiate with the leading figures of the pro-democratic opposition, 
with  relations  mediated  by  the  Catholic  Church.  Even  though  most  of  the 
figures of the pro-democratic opposition took part in the negotiations, the first 
splits and cleavages now began to surface. Among others, two leaders of the 
1 Górski, Rafał, ‘Opór społeczny w Polsce (1944 -1989) II’, In: Przegląd Anarchistyczny nr 6 (2007) 
downloaded from: http://www.przeglad-anarchistyczny.org/samorzad/29-opor-spoleczny-w-polsce-1944-1989-ii
2 Waluszko Janusz P., „Klęska Solidarności D. Osta”, in: Przegląd Anarchistyczny nr 6, downloaded from 
http://www.przeglad-anarchistyczny.org/kultura/24-kleska-solidarnosci-d-osta on 30.01.2012
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1980 strikes, Anna Walentynowicz and Andrzej Gwiazda, did not take part in 
the Round Table, later calling it a ‘rotten compromise’ and ’treason’ to the cause 
of  Polish  independence.  The  cleavages  within  the  Solidarność  camp  were 
mostly  visible  along  ideological  lines  (right-wing  vs.  more  center-oriented 
approaches). On the question of the legal responsibility of the regime’s leaders, 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki as prime minister supported the politics of the ‘thick line’ 
[‘gruba kreska’ in Polish], suggesting that the regime’s actions should be left in 
the past;  others – including the later prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński and 
president  Lech  Kaczyński  –  called  for  a  screening  procedure  [‘lustracja’ in 
Polish] which later became a keyword in Polish politics. In their opinion, people 
that  had been part  of the regime should be banned from public office for  a 
certain period of time and their cooperation should be made public.
After  the  amnesty  of  1986,  Henryk  Wujec  wrote  in  the  "Tygodnik 
Mazowsze",  commenting on the establishment of the Provisional  Council  of 
"Solidarity"  [Komitet  Tymczasowy  'Solidarność']  that:  "despite  the  many 
differences  between  the  activists,  I  consider  the  success  of  the  Union,  as 
evidence of a spirit of conciliation in the search for solutions that would situate 
Solidarność in the new political situation." (Osęka 2011: 19). 
Citizens’ Electoral Committees (Obywatelskie Komitety Wyborcze) won 
all of the 160 seats available in the first round of free elections, and 99 places 
out of 100 in the newly established Senate (one senator was an independent 
entrepreneur,  Janusz Stokłosa).  The electoral  committees were established in 
December 1988 and transformed into a series of political parties soon after the 
elections.  Soon after  the announcement  of  the  results,  a  TV actress,  Joanna 
Szczepkowska, announced on air that with these results ‘communism in Poland 
has finished’. For many this is the date of the end of the transition.
Even though most of the protest from the 1970s onwards was limited to 
strikes, street demonstrations became more frequent during that time. The police 
used harsh measures against protesters (tear gas, water cannons, beatings etc.) 
but no live ammunition as had been the case during protests in 1970 and 1976, 
and under martial  law (introduced on December 13, 1981 and suspended on 
December 31 1982, finally being revoked on July 22 1983), particularly in its 
early stages in 1981 and 1982 when the most infamous massacre took place in 
Wujek  during  the  pacification  of  a  coal  miners’ protest.  The  protests  were 
usually organized by the Solidarność labor union or by smaller political groups 
– from right-wingers, conservatives and nationalists to anarchists, pacifists and 
environmental groups. Many of the protests had local agendas and focused on 
the issues of local factories and their workers, but the most problematic for the 
government were solidarity strikes by workers in many factories at once and 
general  strikes.  Many  of  the  protest  events  were  moreover  not  limited  to 
material claims--for example workers demanded the prosecution of policemen 
accused  of  brutality  in  the  repression  of  other  protests.  Demonstrations  and 
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strikes also accompanied every increase in food prices, which were occasionally 
revoked.  Murals  and  slogans  on  walls  began  to  appear  (some  groups  later 
developed stenciling techniques and began to use spray paint smuggled from 
Czechoslovakia, as it was unavailable in Poland), and many leafleting actions 
were held.
In 1987, a referendum was held asking the citizens their opinion on the 
introduction  of  ‘the  second  stage  of  reforms’  supposed  to  rejuvenate  the 
economy devastated by martial law. The economy would be more open towards 
small business, private entrepreneurship and foreign capital. Even though the 
criteria  for  a  valid  referendum were not  met  (voting turnout  was  below the 
required 50%),  the consultation  showed that  there  was little  support  for  the 
plans. This notwithstanding, the plan was implemented. One of the results was a 
huge increase in food prices in February 1988, which resulted in strikes as well 
as hyperinflation (reaching 639% in 1989). 
The strikes that preceded the transition were, as mentioned, much smaller 
and far less organized than those that led to the registration of Solidarność in 
1980 (for instance, almost all working people in Poland took part in a 4 hour 
warning strike on March 27,  1980).  However,  the threat  of  the de-legalized 
trade unions bringing the whole country to a halt forced the authorities to start 
negotiations with the opposition.
Structural conditions
By the mid 1970s, the era of relative prosperity based on international loans was 
over and the centrally planned economy began to fall into an ever-deeper crisis. 
The rise in living costs (mostly food prices) triggered increasing numbers of 
protests that peaked in 1980 when general strikes became frequent. After martial 
law was waived, the economy was unable to get back on track. To overcome 
this  problem  the  authorities  began  to  liberalize  regulations  on  private 
entrepreneurship.  As Kenney writes,  “The second reason for  the collapse  of 
communism - it  was an economic system that had a fatal flaw [...] growing 
familiarity with the West among the citizens of Central Europe (because more 
people were traveling or met with Western products or have been in contact 
with the Western media) resulted in the awakening of the need of the benefits of 
the  Western  markets”  (Kenney  2005:  19).  The  underground  exchange  of 
videocassettes of western movies and the black market were growing, especially 
since the era of relative prosperity of the early 1970s was still in people’s minds.
Besides economic problems, the aftermath of martial law was observed in 
the de-mobilization of society after the dramatic response of the authorities to 
the  challenging  social  movement  Solidarność  (imprisoning  its  leaders, 
introducing a curfew,  pacifying protests  and using the military to police the 
streets). Not only were people feeling endangered and afraid of further harsh 
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reactions from the regime (during martial law several thousands of dissidents 
were detained under administrative procedures instead of legal ones), they also 
had to struggle with the challenges of everyday life,  mostly triggered by the 
malfunctioning of the centrally planned economy.
After 1981 and the introduction of martial law, a strong divide between 
‘us’ (the people) and ‘them’ (the authorities) resulted in crisis for the political 
regime. “This opposition was crucial for the development of the concept of an 
independent civil society: first, civil society was almost completely framed as 
an  antithesis  to  the  (totalitarian)  state  [...].  Second,  it  was  a  monolithic 
conception, which stressed the unity of opposition of 'us' ('the people') against 
'them' ('the corrupt elite')” (Kopecky 2003: 5). Some scholars add a third group, 
the ‘silent majority’, to this division (especially in the late 1980s)  (Wertenstein-
Żuławski  1991).  The  lack  of  legitimacy  of  the  regime was  becoming  more 
obvious, although there were no opinion polls at the time. Many low-ranking 
party  officials  began  to  take  more  interest  in  their  own  affairs  creating  a 
nomenklatura,  a  kind  of  caste  or  informal  network  of  people  with  the 
connections and know-how for running businesses, mostly associated with the 
communist  party.  After  regime  change,  some  became  the  managers  –  and 
sometimes the owners – of the former state companies and factories. Using their 
ties to former party officials that joined the public administration, they began to 
benefit from the changes in the law. Corruption began to grow and after regime 
change became one of the biggest public concerns and one of the most frequent 
political issues.
Poland was formally tied ‘with eternal friendship’ to the Soviet Union and 
no  serious  decision  was  made  without  consulting  the  Politburo  in  Moscow 
(Roszkowski 1998). The martial law of 1981 was presented as an attempt to 
avoid Soviet invasion (and avoid the scenario witnessed in Czechoslovakia in 
1968), although this claim is still  a  subject  of heated historical and political 
debate. The changes of 1989 would not have been possible without the politics 
of  Mikhail  Gorbachev:  perestroika (reforms)  and  glasnost (openness,  in 
particular in terms of information), which removed the threat of invasion. Also, 
until  its  dissolution  on July  1,  1991,  Poland was –  and had been  since  the 
beginning in 1955 – part of the Warsaw Pact, a military alliance of communist 
countries designed to counterbalance NATO. Also, there were around 300 000 
Soviet troops on Polish territory located in bases outside of Polish control and 
jurisdiction.  Their  withdrawal  between  April  1991  and  the  end  of  1993  is 
considered as one of the milestones of democratization. 
Poland was also involved in geopolitical alliances outside the communist 
world. One such alliance was the London Club – a consortium of over 500 
privately owned banks with which the Polish authorities began to discuss the re-
structuring of Polish debt in 1976. The Paris club, on the other hand, is a group 
for cooperation between ministers of finance from the 19 wealthiest countries in 
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the world. The first negotiations on the restructuring of Polish debts took place 
in 1980; soon after the changes of 1989, around 50% of the debt was cancelled 
and some was converted into subsidies for ecological investments. The EcoFund 
(EkoFundusz) operated with part of the debt, which, rather than being paid back 
to the countries of the Club, was invested in environmentally friendly projects 
and helped the Polish green NGO sector to develop. The successful negotiations 
allowed  the  communist  authorities  to  sign  their  first  agreement  with  the 
International Monetary Fund in 1986. 
Another  factor  that  facilitated  the  transition  was the  signing and  later 
ratification by the Polish authorities of the Helsinki Agreements that granted 
human rights to Polish citizens. This was used by the dissidents in their legal 
struggles  with  the  authorities  and  provided  them  arguments  in  support  of 
democratization:  “referring  to  the  Helsinki  Agreement  of  1975,  signed  by 
almost  all  European countries, intellectuals continually demanded respect for 
fundamental  human  rights.  They  also  revived  the  national  and  religious 
traditions” (Kenney 2005: 20).
The most  important  impulse  for  change  was  the  economic  crisis  (see 
below),  food and goods rationing and the increase  in  food prices.  Also,  the 
government,  aware of  the poor condition of  the state  and its weak position, 
decided  to  open  up  debates  with  the  leaders  of  the  opposition  and  began 
implementing  changes  that  broadened  individual  freedoms.  These  included 
economic reforms (in 1987), which allowed private entrepreneurship to bloom, 
and citizens to buy foreign currency (before these transactions were limited and 
every attempt to buy foreign currency had to be justified, for instance by a trip 
to a conference abroad). 
It was not only the macroeconomic conditions of communist Poland that 
signaled the crisis, shortages were also a daily routine. The Polish economy was 
not only unable to compete on other markets; it also failed to supply its internal 
markets.  The centrally  planned economy had been  based  on heavy  industry 
since the 1940s and by the 1980s this was outdated and struggled for its own 
supplies. The economic system also operated within a different logic; a new 
currency for export transactions was introduced (for international transactions 
the  ‘transfer  ruble’  was  introduced  in  1964  for  transactions  within  the 
communist bloc; it could not be exchanged into any other currency and existed 
only in accounting entries; for the internal market there were bony towarowe – a 
dollar equivalent emitted by the Polish bank and accepted only at certain stores 
with foreign goods, this was introduced January 1, 1960); inflation was hard to 
measure as prices were fixed centrally. Mechanisms such as ‘internal export’ 
were invented.3 Economic ties with the Soviet Union resulted in the selling of 
3 Internal export was a way to collect hard currency from the market. It was not possible to send foreign cur-
rency directly to socialist Poland; it could only be done in the equivalent in coal or construction materials. Since 
these were made locally but paid for in foreign currencies, they were ‘exported internally’. 
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goods,  i.e.  coal,  below  production  cost,  resulting  in  frustration  among  the 
workers and the spread of rumors. Farming was based on state-owned farming 
cooperatives that  were mismanaged and not  flexible  enough to meet  market 
requirements or weather changes. Housing was also controlled by the state, as 
was the sale of cars (used cars were scarce and often more expensive than the 
official  prices  at  the  dealers);  household  appliances  were  available  only  for 
those who received special vouchers. By the late 1980s many basic products for 
daily needs (such as sugar, meat but also alcohol and shoes) were rationed and 
hard to find in stores. People had to queue for almost everything; the supplies in 
stores were irregular and often chaotic (toilet paper – a highly in-demand and 
scarce good  – could be bought in bicycle shops or obtained only after bringing 
recyclable materials such as paper or bottles to special meeting points). More 
luxurious goods like furniture, TVs, household appliances etc. were available 
through complicated systems of pre-payments, official queues, waiting lists and 
recommendations  from  workplaces.  Waiting  times  for  flats,  cars  or  even 
telephone lines were measured in years.  
Examples of social mobilization seen in Eastern Germany (in particular 
the  peace  marches  in  Leipzig  and  Dresden)  gave  activists  new  hope. 
Connections with dissidents from Czechoslovakia (meetings were held in the 
mountains at the border) showed that similar situations were developing in other 
parts of the communist bloc.  The rise of the global  human rights movement 
became a huge support for the dissidents, who claimed that communism could 
not guarantee such rights to its citizens. Growing political pressure on the USSR 
and other communist regimes, mostly from Germany, the US and the UK, was 
steered  towards  the  peaceful  solution  of  internal  conflicts  between  the 
authorities and society. The Nobel peace prize awarded to Lech Wałęsa in 1983 
and the later implementation of the Helsinki agreements were important steps in 
this process. These gave the opposition in Poland support from other countries 
as well as legal tools for struggling against the regime. The actions of pope John 
Paul II were also placed pressure on the communist party officials. Much of this 
information,  as  well  some  news  from Poland,  reached  the  people  over  the 
airwaves of  Radio Free Europe,  which communist  authorities  unsuccessfully 
tried to jam.
Contingent political opportunities
The Peoples’ Republic of Poland was a ‘people’s democracy’ with the ‘leading 
role of the party’ mentioned in the constitution. The main party was the Polish 
United Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza; PZPR), formed 
in 1948, mainly from the Polish Workers Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza; PPR). 
The two other parties were the Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne; 
SD) and the United Folk Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe; ZSL, which 
took  part  of  the  electorate  and  structures  of  the  pre-war  farmers’  party). 
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Although formally independent, both fully supported the PZPR. No other party 
was  officially  registered,  although  some  right  wing  parties  (such  as  the 
Confederation  of  Independent  Poland  –  Konfederacja  Polski  Niepodległej; 
KPN), the Polish Socialist  Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna;  PPS) and the 
Communist Party of Poland (Komunistyczna Partia Polski; KPP) had their own 
underground structures. The rank-and-file members of the PPS and KPP, whose 
elites were in conflict with the Soviet-supported the PPR and later the PZPR, 
gradually  joined  the  structures  of  the  PZPR,  and  eventually  these  groups 
became marginalized.  The PZPR, which at  its  peak had 3 million members, 
suffered a decline in membership in the 1980s. I kept a hold of its unofficial 
monopoly on political life however.
The  communist  regime  was  most  repressive  at  its  beginnings,  but 
repression gradually declined with the exception of the 1981 martial law. In the 
1940s and 1950s brutal interrogations, death sentences for political prisoners, 
kidnappings  etc.  were  nothing  unusual.  The  secret  police  became  the  most 
powerful organization by spreading terror and fear. By the end of the 1980s the 
Peoples’ Militia (police forces) dispersed demonstrations, but court trials ended 
in smaller  sentences.  The Security  Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa;  SB,  the 
secret police) was also progressively less brutal, although in 1984 two of its 
officers  received  prison  sentences  for  kidnapping  and  killing  a  priest,  Jerzy 
Popiełuszko, who was the chaplain of Solidarność. Over the years, the police 
(both  the  secret  and  the  normal  branches)  shifted  tactics  from  beatings  at 
stations (during interrogations or as preparation for interrogations) to infiltration 
and the use of collaborators. Regime oppression could be observed at different 
levels; directly there were the beatings, arrests and imprisonment for ‘hostile 
propaganda’ or  ‘conspiracy  to  overthrow  the  regime’,  house  searches  etc. 
Indirectly,  many  activists  lost  their  jobs,  students  were  thrown  out  of 
universities  and  schools,  and  psychological  harassment  was  used.  In  1980s, 
under international pressure, the authorities ceased giving prison sentences to 
activists and imposed fines instead. In fact, the “Majority [of the activists] felt 
fines more painfully than jail. In 1987, when the average monthly wage varied 
between  fifteen  and  twenty  thousand,  the  typical  fine  for  participating  in 
demonstrations or distribution of underground publications amounted to fifty 
thousand  zlotys”4 (Kenney  2005:  41).  This  had  tremendous  consequences: 
“People  lost  their  jobs,  and sometimes flats  (if  you lived in  a  dormitory or 
workers  hotel).  Without  being  registered  it  was  not  possible  to  get  a  job” 
(Kenney 2005: 42).
The secret police collected all data potentially useful for blackmailing, for 
instance information about sexual preferences (in cases of homosexuals this was 
done in the frame of actions that received the codename ‘Hiacynt’ [hyacinth]) or 
after involvement in petty crimes such as drunk driving. Many trips abroad were 
conditional to an agreement to collaborate with the intelligence service or the 
4 About $ 20 at black-market exchange rate in the 1980s.
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secret police, who wanted to get information about the Polish diaspora, their 
political  preferences  and plans  to  support  the  opposition  in  Poland.  As  Osa 
writes:  “in  1980-81  the  repressive  capacities  of  the  state  were  significantly 
reduced as a result of social mobilization capacities. This was partly influenced 
by  the  low  morale  of  the  party  apparatus  and  government  as  well  as  the 
depletion of declining state resources and organizational effectiveness. Another 
reason was the growing number of nationalist organizations, which caught the 
attention  of  the  Security  Service.  The  leaders  of  the  party  had  to  suppress 
radical organizations, such as KPN, which undermined the socialist order and 
alliance  with  the  USSR.  No  response  could  exacerbate  relations  with  the 
Kremlin” (Osa, 2008: 237).
After the years of relative prosperity (in the early 1970s) the communist 
hardliners were not only marginalized in Polish politics, there were also less and 
less  of  them.  By  the  late  1970s  (when  the  coming  crisis  had  already  been 
signaled)  many  among  the  party  elites  were  pragmatic  apparatchiks  that 
understood that party membership was a gateway to a better career or business 
opportunities. These people were much more open towards discussions about 
Marxism-Leninism and communist dogmas. At the same time, a new class of 
intelligentsia was rising – educated people living in large cities that travelled 
around the world (this was much easier from the early 1970s). Many members 
of university faculties supported the opposition.
The  main  ally  for  the  dissidents  was  the  Catholic  Church  and 
conservative parts of society. The Church was not homogenous in its support for 
the opposition. After its hard-won independence achieved in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, Church leaders were reluctant to confront the authorities: “although 
individual  clergymen,  like  Father  Popieluszko,  supported  Solidarność 
throughout  its  legitimate  activities  and  during  the  martial  law,  the  Church 
leaders such as Cardinal Primate Jozef Glemp, had serious doubts in connection 
with the leftist currents in opposition, as well as to the harm that could result to 
the nation by confrontation with the use of force” (Kenney 2005: 48). Framing 
the anti-regime struggles as a fight for independence allowed anti-communist 
battles to be linked with previous wars for independence. This deepened the ‘us’ 
vs. ‘them’ division and reinforced the confrontational attitude of the dissidents. 
The communist party had almost no internal allies after losing the trust of 
the  workers.  The  opposition  could  win  the  trust  and  support  of  workers, 
students, farmers and intellectuals, whereas those belonging to these groups that 
supported the regime were already party members. Local party structures were 
also becoming less dogmatic and could not be relied upon by the party elites as 
their  members  were  more  focused  on  their  own  agendas  and  wellbeing. 
Internationally, the Polish authorities had the support of other communist parties 
in the region. This, however, weakened over time as other countries were facing 
similar problems to Poland. After perestroika the leaders of the Soviet Union 
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were  less  reliable  as  potential  allies  as  they  had  to  address  internal  party 
struggles,  growing independence movements in the Soviet  republics  and the 
Afghan war.
Actors in the transition: elites
In the late 1980s the hardline faction of the communist party became internally 
marginalized, and the new communist elites became much more pragmatic and 
less  ideological.  After  martial  law  was  suspended,  the  Prime  Minister 
Mieczysław Rakowski and minister for internal affairs Czesław Kiszczak began 
a process of normalization. The biggest challenge for the regime was how to 
implement this process (mostly through economic reforms), while at the same 
time fighting the deepening economic crisis. Normalization also included social 
engineering  to  close  the  gap  between  the  elites  and  the  society,  which  was 
manifested in a less repressive attitude towards dissidents. 
No new foreign loans were available and the previous loans needed to be 
paid back. In 1980 and 1981, Poland in fact went bankrupt, as it could not pay 
its debts to the countries of the Paris Club. Also, the centrally planned economy, 
based  mostly  on  heavy  industry,  was  proving  ineffective.  Losing  complete 
power (in particular over the economy), the regime elites began to understand 
that further confrontation with the dissidents would be devastating for them. 
This was one of the main reasons why negotiations with the opposition were 
initiated.  In  addition,  the  communist  party  was facing internal  conflicts  and 
many members were becoming ideologically disillusioned. After the amnesty of 
1986, experts from the Ministry of the Interior,  in a top secret memo to the 
Political Bureau from the beginning of September, stated that "covering [the 
leading opposition activists] with the Act [of amnesty] will allow us to develop 
broader  international  politics,  which  should  bring  an  improvement  in  many 
areas and result in positive outcomes for the country." The suggestions to the 
Communist Party leadership included the withdrawal of the sanctions imposed 
after December 13th, and the negotiation of new loans that would at least allow 
the specter of an economic disaster to be dismissed. According to the experts, 
the MSW [Ministry of Interior Affairs] amnesty would "weaken the position of 
the so-called opposition. [This would] create an atmosphere of distrust in the 
circles of political opponents" (Osęka 2011: 19). Insignificant facade opposition 
groups were to replace various institutions - such as the Advisory Council to the 
President  of  the Council  of  State  -  and,  by  creating the illusion of  political 
pluralism,  block the  catastrophic  deterioration  of  the  social  mood.  Only  the 
failure of these plans led general Jaruzelski to negotiate with the underground 
"Solidarity" in mid-1988 (Osęka 2011: 19).
Another potentially relevant elite was the military. The Polish army after 
World  War  II  was  initially  formally  dependent  on  the  Soviet  Red  Army  – 
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significantly, the first field marshal, Konstanty Rokossowski, did not even speak 
Polish.  Later  on,  after  the  Warsaw Pact  of  1955,  the  Polish  Peoples’ Army 
(Ludowe Wojsko Polskie, LWP) became a part of the communist armed forces. 
Polish soldiers had to “steadfastly defend freedom, independence and frontiers 
of the Polish People's Republic against temptations of imperialism, steadfastly 
stand guard over peace in fraternal  alliance with the Soviet Army and other 
allied armies”5. At the same time around 300 000 Soviet soldiers were stationed 
in Poland (as opposed to approx. 150 000 Polish soldiers). Military service was 
compulsory and at the time of transition lasted 1.5 years (2 for the navy). Most 
of  the  officers  were  educated  in  Moscow,  in  particular  the  political  officers 
responsible  for  maintaining  the  morale  of  the  soldiers  in  accordance  with 
socialist principles. At the same time the army was highly respected and many 
trusted it, with the exception of general Wojciech Jaruzelski, the leader under 
martial law (he became the head of the Military Council for National Salvation 
[Wojskowa Radsa Ocalenia Narodowego, WRON] in what appeared to some 
(Davis  1998:  1021)  a  coup  d’état.  Also,  most  of  the  cadres  showed  little 
political ambition. 
One of the changes of the transition was that civilians came to control and 
manage the army – a  situation that  was questioned in 1994 at  the so-called 
‘Drawsko lunch’ (‘obiad drawski’ – Drawsko is a small town home to a huge 
military training ground). A group of high-ranking officers,  supported by the 
president Lech Wałęsa, questioned the civilian control over the army. After a 
personnel change at the ministry of defense, such claims were not raised again. 
Unlike under martial law, the army was more a stabilizing force than a threat 
during the transition period.
The Catholic Church supported the pro-democratic opposition and tried to 
struggle  (albeit  not  openly)  against  the  communist  authorities  for  whom,  it 
claimed, turning Poland into an atheist country was a goal in itself. Since 1981, 
a new cardinal, Józef Glemp, had led cautious but pro-opposition politics in the 
Church. The election of John Paul II as pope supported the opposition, as it led 
to a massive growth in religious life. The involvement of the Church with the 
opposition was more hidden than ostentatious, but its influence on the leaders of 
the opposition is hard to understate (Ost  2005).  Some priests,  such as Jerzy 
Popiełuszko  or  Henryk  Jankowski,  supported  the  opposition  morally  and 
materially, either during services or by collecting and distributing humanitarian 
aid to the families of repressed citizens.
Facing deepening economic crisis and growing popular demands, Prime 
Minister Rakowski introduced new laws in 1986, opening up spaces for private 
entrepreneurship. Small businesses that in previous decades had been subjected 
to many checks, criticisms and malicious propaganda, now received plenty of 
5 Military oath: ‘Rota przysięgi wojskowej’, Ustawa z dn. 22.11.52, Dziennik ustaw 46, poz. 310.The text of the 
oath was changed In June 1988. 
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freedom.  In  the  next  few years  more  and  more  economic  sectors  were  de-
regulated,  and the spirit  of entrepreneurship swept freely throughout Poland. 
Farmers then began to sell their products at marketplaces in the cities (before 
this had been complicated and some of the crops had to be sold at state-owned 
points  at  regulated  and unattractive  prices),  and the  streets  were  filled  with 
people selling all sorts of goods (Borodziej and Kochanowski 2010). Soon after 
the new government took power, and the state monopoly on currency exchange 
was lifted,  which helped the Poles going abroad to sell  or  buy goods (West 
Berlin was at one point so full of Polish street vendors as to become anecdotal, 
and soon all places occupied by street vendors from Eastern Europe were called 
Polen Maerkte). Before, small entrepreneurs had been accused (in propaganda, 
but sometimes also by public prosecutors) of speculation and of being parasites 
on the ‘body of the socialist economy’. Small businessmen were not organized 
in any way, but their actions showed real alternatives to the communist system, 
especially in its economic dimension.
Large parts of the intelligentsia (the educated class) opposed the regime 
in more or less straightforward ways. Academics in the humanities and social 
sciences,  but  also  many  lawyers,  medical  doctors,  architects  and  artists 
participated in protests. Although quotations from Marx and Engels were quasi-
obligatory  in  academic  writings  (and  courses  in  Marxism-Leninism  or 
materialist  dialectics  were  compulsory  for  almost  all  students  and  soldiers), 
many intellectuals supported the dissidents. A whole industry of underground 
publishing – similar to soviet  samizdat –developed, printing both the works of 
Polish intellectuals and classics that were prohibited by the censor’s office (the 
collected works of Karl Popper for instance were published by the thousand). 
The  more  Catholic-oriented  intellectuals  read  the  Tygodnik  Powszechny 
magazine, and others Kultura, published in Paris by Jerzy Giedroyc. Also, after 
the end of martial law, illegal courses – a so-called ‘underground university’ – 
were  held  at  private  homes,  where  lectures  on  ‘real’ (i.e.  not  changed  by 
communist  propaganda)  history  and  philosophy  were  given.  This  not  only 
mobilized  students  and  other  intellectuals.  Activists  formed  an  intellectual 
backbone  for  the  opposition  movement,  wrote  for  and  edited  underground 
journals  and magazines,  and translated  books.  Also  with  their  networks  and 
knowledge of  foreign languages  they could lobby for  support  from Western 
countries,  mostly  in  the  form of  money  and  printing  materials  but  also  for 
support for imprisoned dissidents.
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Actors in the transition: Civil society
Democratization movements
When analyzing the actors of the opposition in Central Europe at the end of 
1980s, Padraic Kenney distinguishes five main currents:
– dissidents (the term is sometimes controversial, often they are referred to 
as  'intellectual  opposition'),  reformists  and  revisionists,  who  tried  to 
change the system from the inside (in particular in the 1960s in Poland 
and  in  Czechoslovakia  after  the  events  of  1968,  many  changed  their 
positions);
– civil society (KOR, Charter 77) that postulated 'living' in truth
– the Church (mainly Poland, and Slovakia);
– counterculture, and rock music in particular (the communist states did not 
prohibit it, but certain limitations were applied and occasional repression 
took place);
– the national opposition (support for national  liberation) (Kenney 2005: 
21-2).
The main democratization movement was Solidarność. Formally a trade union, 
it quickly broadened its claims to cover respect for human rights, freedom of 
speech and a free press etc. Among its leading figures were Bronisław Geremek, 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bogdan Lis, Władysław Frasyniuk, Adam Michnik, Jacek 
Kuroń, Andrzej Gwiaza, Anna Walentynowicz and Zbigniew Bujak. Stressing 
the importance of the rise of independent civil society organizations, one of the 
leaders of the dissident movement, Bronisław Geremek said, that: “the idea of a 
civil  society  –  even  one  that  avoids  overtly  political  activities  in  favor  of 
education,  the exchange of information and opinion, or the protection of the 
basic  interests  of  the  particular  groups  –  has  enormous  anti-totalitarian 
potential” (1992:4). The idea of independent organizations (a network) had far-
reaching consequences. As Marek Skovajsa writes: “The strategy of the 'new 
evolutionism', propounded by Adam Michnik in his famous 1976 essay, aimed 
at fostering and developing a parallel society, independent of the state, and at 
first  sight  did  not  look  too  different  from  Benda’s  proposal.  The  crucial 
difference was, however, that while the Czech dissidents regarded the expansion 
of antiregime activism into a society-wide phenomenon as little more than a 
utopian hope, Michnik foresaw the constitution of a mass and nonelitist parallel 
social structure” (Skovajsa 2008:54-55).
The direct predecessor of the Solidarność movement was the Workers’ 
Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników - KOR) established in 1976 
after the brutal repression of strikes in Ursus and Radom. KOR was founded as 
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a group providing legal aid for the oppressed workers using the tools given by 
the communist  legal  framework,  especially  the constitution and the Helsinki 
Agreements. These agreements had a special status for the opposition, since “In 
June 1974, the Free Democrats Movement (Ruch Wolnych Demokratów, RWD) 
was founded. Its objective was to control the implementation of the Helsinki 
agreements, by the Polish authorities. The movement sought democratic reform 
in the long run. It regarded human rights as a starting point for the expansion of 
civil liberties” (Osa, 2008: 231).
KOR was  composed  mostly  of  lawyers  who defended  the  workers  in 
trials after the protests in Radom and Ursus. It also provided material support 
for  workers  and  the  families  of  those  who  were  imprisoned.  Solidarność, 
formally a trade union, had a hierarchical structure, with its charismatic leader 
and  chairperson  Lech  Wałęsa  (later  the  president  of  Poland)  at  the  top.  Its 
structure  included  regional  divisions  and  regional  chapters  referring  to 
particular  industry  branches  (miners,  steel  workers,  dockers),  which allowed 
greater  flexibility  and  offered  more  possibilities  for  solidarity  strikes. 
Solidarność had its own budget (from membership fees and external donations), 
newspapers and magazines, and at one point even issued stamps.6
The main claim of the democratization movement was that the authorities 
should start respecting the law of Poland. The activists also called for political 
pluralism, the freedom of assembly (and most importantly the right to establish 
independent  trade unions)  and the freedom of speech.  Many of their  claims 
were linked to the Helsinki Agreement, which guaranteed the respect of human 
rights in Poland. The movement used legal struggles as a main tool, but also 
published  samizdat books  and  other  materials.  Many  of  its  protests  were 
symbolic,  such  as  wearing dimmers  on jackets  (in  Polish,  the  word for  the 
electrical component dimmer is ‘opornik’, and ‘opór’ means resistance, both in 
the electrical and the political sense) or going for walks when the flagship news 
program was shown on TV (one of their main slogans was that ‘TV is lying’). 
All of these actions targeted the oppressive side of the regime. Solidarność – 
together with the Catholic Church – also sought to promote sobriety as a way to 
fight  the  authorities.  Since  1980,  every  August  was  announced as  a  ‘month 
without alcohol’, and strict abstention was enforced during every strike.
One of the main differences introduced by Polish dissidents at the time of 
establishing the KOR as compared to anti-regime actions that had taken place 
earlier was the openness of their actions. This was a major change compared to 
the post World War II underground and outnumbered dissidents of the 1960s. In 
the 1980s, dissidents used their own names when signing petitions and writing 
court appeals, openly supporting the workers and their families. Their actions 
were public and most of the time legal; nonviolence was widely agreed upon (in 
6 http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/anthropology-in-practice/2012/07/23/the-cultural-legacy-of-postage/, also 
Evans 1992
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the late 1980s smaller splinter and grassroots groups promoted some forms of 
direct action). With the rapid growth of the Solidarność movement, structures 
were established that provided legal help, financial support for the families of 
imprisoned activists and publications. 
The paradigm of openness was partially abandoned when martial law was 
introduced and many dissidents were imprisoned. Some of the local chapters of 
the Solidarność movement developed counter-intelligence groups that targeted 
and analyzed the  actions  of  the  secret  police,  and tried  to  trace  undercover 
agents  within  the  movement.  Kornel  Morawiecki  established  Solidarność 
Walcząca  in  Wrocław,  and  “In  1982  Morawiecki  created  the  main  Polish 
underground unit  -  Fighting  Solidarity  [Solidarność  Walcząca],  who proudly 
referred to the partisan underground of World War II. Subordinated to military 
discipline and working in deep secrecy, the organization was a symbol of active 
resistance of Poles” (Kenney 2005: 39). Along with flyers (usually thrown down 
onto the streets from high buildings),  pamphlets and  samizdat books, murals 
were also becoming a popular form of action. In the late 1980s wildcat strikes 
became  more  and  more  popular,  and  did  not  always  make  financial  claims 
(sometimes they called for the release of political prisoners). After the amnesty 
of  1986,  the  Provisional  Council  of  Solidarność  [Komitet  Tymczasowy 
Solidarność] marked the beginning of what one underground newspaper defined 
"post-amnesty euphoria". More and more regional executive committees "came 
to the surface", revealing the names of their members. After the events of 1986, 
the  opposition  entered  a  period  of  half-open  trade  union  activity,  which 
continued until the re-legalization of "Solidarity" in April 1989.
Labour Movement
The  movement  developed  from  the  Inter-Factory  Strike  Committees  (an 
umbrella organization, Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy, gathering protest 
committees in numerous workplaces) that mushroomed in the summer of 1980 
after the government’s decision to increase food prices. As Barker writes: “For 
more  than  two  weeks  about  three  million  Polish  workers  took  part  in 
occupations  and  strikes  in  more  than  1.500  plants.  Waves  of  strikes  were 
coordinated by regional Inter-Enterprise Strike Committees (Międzyzakładowe 
Komitety  Strajkowe,  MKS)”  (Barker  2008:  264).  In  August  1980  massive 
strikes brought the communist state industry to a halt, resulting in its signing the 
21  August  Agreements  (Porozumienia  Sieprniowe)  between  August  30  and 
September 11, 1980. One of the claims of the workers was the formation of an 
independent trade union confederation, which was granted on September 17, 
1980, and confirmed on November 10, 1980 when the Solidarność trade union 
was registered at a court in Warsaw. On May 12, 1981 the farmers’ section of 
the  union,  the  Niezależny  Samorządny  Związek  Zawodowy  Rolników 
Indywidualnych Solidarność, was also registered at a court. 
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The workers also demanded salary increases; better working conditions, 
amnesty for their imprisoned colleagues, an end to the harassment of activists 
and  a  decline  in  censorship.  Later  their  claims  extended  to  the  right  to  an 
independent  workers’  movement,  the  opening  of  the  political  system  (by 
introducing party pluralism),  freedom of speech and religious practices (also 
understood as the right to build new churches, often declined by the authorities). 
Despite some agreements being reached, the wave of strikes continued: “the 
authorities have signed an agreement in Gdansk, but hesitated before putting it 
into effect. Solidarity activists have repeatedly entered into confrontations with 
the authorities, trying to persuade them to fulfill their promises. The conflict 
intensified and spread to the whole social  system. It  became a real cycle of 
protest” (Osa, 2008: 231).
The movement’s main tool and source of leverage was the strike. With 
nearly  a  quarter  of  the  population  belonging  to  Solidarność  (estimates  are 
around  9-10  million  people  in  a  country  with  a  population  of  36  million), 
dissidents could use this numeric strength in negotiations with the authorities. 
Protest ranged from putting up flags (national and – more often – Solidarność 
flags) on buildings, to warning strikes (usually 3-4 hours), solidarity strikes with 
other factories, occupations and general strikes. Where strikes were not allowed 
(in hospitals for example) or when it would cause damage to the image of the 
unions, a particular form of strike was introduced, the ‘Italian strike’ [‘strajk 
włoski’ in Polish, ‘sciopero bianco’ in Italian], which is a kind of work-to-rule, 
strike.  This  consisted  in  the  precise  and  scrupulous  adhesion  to  rules  and 
regulations,  thus  disrupting  effective  and  efficient  work.  Independent 
newsletters and magazines were published presenting the activists’ visions of 
the protests and their policing. Workers organized within Solidarność improved 
their negotiating position with their employers as well as with local authorities.
Student movements
On September 19, 1980 an independent student’s union (Niezależne Zrzeszenie 
Studentów – NZS) was formed and registered by the authorities on February 17, 
1981. It  functioned under the auspices of Solidarność,  but  over time, as the 
university  students became more and more radicalized,  other  groups became 
more  popular  among  them.  For  instance,  “led  by  the  Leszek  Moczulski 
Confederation  of  Independent  Poland  (Konfederacja  Polski  Niepodległej, 
KPN), an openly nationalist group was convinced that the days of socialism in 
Poland were numbered, and the country should leave the Soviet bloc and create 
a  multiparty  democracy.  Proponents  of  Moczulski  were  seen  as  right-wing 
radicals. Members of the Confederation were often the target of the Security 
Service” (Osa,  2008: 233). KPN was particularly popular among students of 
history and law; students from other faculties preferred actions organized by 
New Social Movements (see below) and became their base supporters. Prior to 
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martial law regulations on student governments were quite liberal, resulting in a 
willingness to use this framework to fight for the opposition's own purposes 
(e.g.  in  Wroclaw  a  group  called  "The  Twelve"  dominated  university  life) 
(Kenney 2005: 50).
New social movements/s
The shift of dissidents towards more conservative positions (especially after the 
killing of Solidarność’s chaplain, Jerzy Popiełuszko in 1984), together with the 
support of Pope John Paul II, resulted in the emergence of many small youth-
based groups that were critical of the communist authorities as well as the pro-
democratic dissidents. Because of their anti-systemic attitude, they rejected the 
communist authorities while also claiming that the dissidents were too eager to 
compromise  with  the  state.  Another  criticism  was  that  the  mainstream 
opposition had made a sharp turn to the right and had too close connections to 
the Catholic Church (Kenney 2002). One of the best-known groups of this kind 
was  the  Orange  Alternative  (Pomarańczowa  Alternatywa),  established  in 
Wrocław (cf. Kenney 2002, Tyszka 1998). This group later became known for 
its  absurd street  happenings,  which attracted thousands of  people.  One such 
action is described by Kenney: “A group of two-hundred Orange Alternative 
activists  started  to  reach  the  top  of  the  mountain  in  August  1988  (some 
benefited  from  the  ski  lift)  staging  an  unsuccessful  re-invasion  of 
Czechoslovakia on the twentieth anniversary of the 1968 military intervention. 
Major Frydrych donned a samurai  outfit,  had a huge sword.  Paweł Kocięba 
managed to get himself a GDR army officer's uniform. Anarchists also came 
from Gdańsk, waved a black flag. It is unbelievable, but it came to dispel the 
mistrust  that  still  prevailed  in  the  relations  between  Czechoslovakians  and 
Poles.  The events  of  the  1968  years  lay  especially  in  the  hearts  of  the  old 
oppositionists” (Kenney 2005: 133). As it is stated on the group’s website: “It is 
said that the name of Orange Alternative came from Orange being in the middle 
of colors representing two major political powers in Poland (until this very day)
—the Red for the Communist or left, and the Yellow for the Church and the 
right7”.  Street  happenings  organized  by  the  Orange  Alternative  became 
legendary after Toilet Paper Day (when all participants were supposed to bring a 
few rolls of toilet paper –resulting in the police arresting everyone possessing 
such  items)  or  the  Santa  Claus  fests  (when  police  could  not  differentiate 
between the ‘real’ Santa Clauses and the ‘orange’ ones and also began mass 
arrests).
When analyzing the history of the movement Wolność i Pokój, Kenney 
writes:  “Today WiP is  sometimes mentioned as a  group of  media  attention-
hungry students who ousted Solidarity from center stage for a short time. It is 
7 http://www.pomaranczowa_alternatywa.republika.pl/orange%20alternative%20overview.html accessed 
14.02.2012 also: Kenney 2005: 191
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no shame, because this just happened to be in the middle of the decade, when 
Solidarity was not doing anything that was worthy of attention” (Kenney 2005: 
80). These movements found a way to channel the energy of young people at 
the same time as criticizing some of the dissidents’ positions. In retaliation, their 
members were mostly excluded from the negotiations at the Round Table that 
led to the changes: “the Communists opposed the extremists who could not sit 
at  the negotiating table, 'the constructive opposition',  as it  was called. In the 
group of extremists were the most eminent thinkers of Solidarność: Jacek Kuroń 
and  Adam Michnik.  They  were  accepted  only  after  weeklong  negotiations. 
From the standpoint of the regime it was not possible to talk seriously with the 
'happeners'  of  the  Orange  Alternative,  and  their  followers,  who  refused  the 
fulfillment of patriotic duty that is military service, or with the radicals of the 
so-called group of Krakow, that is the militants of Wojciech Polaczek, radical 
wing of the WiP with Marek Kurzyniec and others, not only from Krakow, who 
were socialized in an atmosphere of confrontation” (Kenney 2005: 298).
For many young activists the actions of Solidarność were too moderate 
and some issues were ignored, in particular compulsory military service and 
environmental issues, the latter being particularly visible after the Chernobyl 
catastrophe  of  1986  and  the  prospect  of  building  a  nuclear  power  plant  in 
Poland. Campaigns against the planned nuclear power plants in Żarnowiec and 
Klempicz as well as the struggles against the construction of a dam in Czorsztyn 
are considered the birthplace of the Polish ecological movement. Although other 
organizations focused on environmental conservation, the campaigns of the late 
1980s were much more inspired by subcultures and countercultures and used a 
different  and  more  direct  action  repertoire.  Other  campaigns  and  important 
issues  shared  with  the  New  Social  Movements  were  pacifism,  which 
incorporated Peace Marches (Easter marches in particular), protests against the 
war  in  Afghanistan  and  for  the  abolition  of  compulsory  military  service. 
Women’s issues were much less visible and more present in academic debates 
than in social activism.
Pacifist groups and those resisting compulsory military service, such as 
Wolność  i  Pokój  (Freedom  and  Peace,  WiP)  or  Ruch  Społeczeństwa 
Alternatywnego (Movement for an Alternative Society, RSA) began to gather 
more (mostly young) participants. As an activist and influential anarchist author, 
Rafał Górski, recalls of those days: “There was a new form of protest organized 
by  the  anti-military  and  pacifist-ecological  movement  Freedom  and  Peace 
(Wolność I Pokój - WiP). It consisted of the veterans of KPN, Solidarity, and the 
new generation of anarchists,  leftists,  as  well  as conservatives and Christian 
Democrats. The dominant actions were small-scale hunger strikes, the takeover 
of trams for the purposes of demonstrations and the occupation of scaffolding 
until the intervention of the MO (militia, the state police). In 1985 WiP initiated 
an action for returning military books (a document with the details of draft and 
military  service)  to  the Ministry of  National  Defense  and the refusal  of  the 
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military  oath8”.  These  groups  were  also  much  more  radical  than  the  main 
organizations of the pro-democratic opposition: “Freedom and Peace has never 
sought a settlement with the Communists. The group appealed to the regime, 
calling for explicit changes in the law, but this was done on issues that did not 
leave room for compromise” (Kenney 2005: 74). One such case was the right to 
an alternative to military service (which was theoretically possible, but was not 
granted  to  anyone).  Many  of  the  groups  were  associated  and  connected  to 
subcultures  and  counterculture  and  many  of  their  leaders  were  musicians, 
theatre actors and movie directors. Lots of activists did not join any organized 
group, relying instead on small, locally based collectives and groups that picked 
up particular topics and campaigns. Many of them were university students who 
– together with high school pupils – formed the majority of the activists. For 
example: “People aged 15-25 saw Freedom and Peace as the new elite. They 
were fearless, determined and, as you could hear, seemed to throw best parties. 
According to some people, this community presented what was the best in the 
culture of late 1980s” (Kenney 2005: 82).
The main frame for the New Social Movements was opposition to the 
communist regime, but the stress was put on particular issues: environmental 
damage,  compulsory  military  service  and  freedom  of  speech.  Many  of  the 
actions  and  campaigns  of  these  groups  either  criticized  the  mainstream 
dissidents or raised issues not mentioned by the pro-democratic camp. They also 
stressed the rejection of conservatisms: Catholic (represented more and more by 
the Solidarność movement) and communist.  This opposition to the dissidents 
and the Church was seen at its best at cultural events: music concerts, street 
performances etc. Many artists and musicians began to support these grassroots 
groups.  As  Juliusz  Tyszka  writes:  “probably  the  most  important  function  of 
Fydrych's  happenings  was therapeutic.  The events  on  Świdnicka  Street,  Old 
Market  Square,  and their  surroundings enabled the participants  to  overcome 
their  fear  -  the  most  important  and the  most  ominous effect  of  Communist 
power, especially during the period of Martial Law. After hundreds of bloody 
street fights all over Poland (and in Wroclaw in particular), it was not easy to 
face the militia on the street once more, to be arrested and interrogated. It was 
possible, however, and it turned out that the police were not as tough, severe, 
and cruel as they had been before. The times had changed; the powers seemed 
not to be as omnipotent as in 1982-83” (Tyszka 1998: 317).
The mobilization of the New Social Movements relied on young people 
often recruited through subcultural  and countercultural  frames.  These groups 
were also much more radical and more likely to use direct action (occupations, 
sit-ins, street protests, hunger strikes, chaining themselves to scaffoldings etc.) 
than  others.  What  characterized  many  of  their  street  protests  vis-à-vis  the 
demonstrations of the Solidarność camp was the use of humor. Górski writes: 
8 Górski, Rafał, ‘Opór społeczny w Polsce (1944 -1989) II’, In: Przegląd Anarchistyczny nr 6 (2007) 
downloaded from: http://www.przeglad-anarchistyczny.org/samorzad/29-opor-spoleczny-w-polsce-1944-1989-ii
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“Larger demonstrations of WiP took the form of peaceful street sit-ins. On the 
other  hand,  since  June  1986  street  happenings  were  organized  in  Wroclaw, 
which troubled and embarrassed the police and party authorities. The anarchist 
"Orange Alternative" organized celebrations of the Great October Revolution 
(in which the militiamen were the ‘white’ soldiers), the day of the militia or the 
Revolution of the Dwarfs9”. At the same time an intensive production of leaflets 
took  place  and,  at  the  time  of  the  transition,  many  students  occupied  their 
universities, organized sit-ins, and picketed.
Ethnic Movement/s
Poland is one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in Europe (for many 
years  it  was  only  Iceland  that  had  less  minorities,  until  a  large  wave  of 
migration  to  Iceland  from  Poland).  According  to  the  census  of  2002  (the 
previous census of  1946 is  not  regarded as representative),  1.23% of Polish 
population  declared  a  nationality  other  than  Polish  and  2.03%  declared  no 
national  belonging.  The  largest  ethnic  minorities  are  Silesians,  Germans, 
Belarusians  and Ukrainians  –  all  of  which are  highly  integrated  into  Polish 
society. After the transition, new laws were issued on minority rights (art. 35 of 
the constitution of 1997, law of 1991 on teaching in ethnic languages in public 
schools  and  the  law  of  1992  on  public  broadcasting  in  ethnic  languages). 
Nevertheless prejudices exist against the Roma people and Jews (the latter is 
more symbolic, as only 1130 people declared themselves Jewish in the 2002 
census). On 26 and 27 of June 1991, in the city of Mława in central Poland riots 
spread after a young Roma injured two people in a car accident and fled. After 
two nights of the vandalization of Roma property, the police managed to restore 
peace. Other incidents against ethnic minorities were sporadic.
After 1989 many local associations and foundations were established to 
promote  the  local  cultures  of  the  minorities,  provide  education  for  their 
members and about the groups. The vast majority was not political.
One of the main frames of the ethnic groups was the need to show their 
cultural ‘otherness’ by promoting local ethnic artists and folklore. Also, there 
were  demands  for  the  official  acknowledgement  of  minorities  (in  particular 
Germans),  the  right  to  teach  in  minorities’ languages  and  access  to  public 
broadcasting with programs in local dialects and about ethnic issues.
One of  the victories  of  the ethnic  movements was the waiving of  the 
required 5% electoral threshold for committees of ethnic minorities in popular 
elections in 2001.10 So far, only the representatives of the German minority have 
9 Górski, Rafał, ‘Opór społeczny w Polsce (1944 -1989) II’, In: Przegląd Anarchistyczny nr 6 (2007) 
downloaded from: http://www.przeglad-anarchistyczny.org/samorzad/29-opor-spoleczny-w-polsce-1944-1989-ii
10 Polish electoral regulations require political parties to reach a 3% threshold to receive state subsidies and 5% 
to enter the parliament (8% for coalitions). In the upper chamber of the parliament – the Senate – members are 
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managed  to  get  members  (usually  one  or  two)  elected  to  parliament.  Other 
lobbying regarded issues of bilingual teaching at schools and dual names for 
cities and villages. Local groups established and reinforced their identities by 
organizing cultural events where they presented parts of their folklore: dances, 
food and other things.
Religious movement/s
Poland is a country dominated by Catholics – around 96% of the population 
belongs (through baptism) to the Catholic Church and today around 43% attend 
Sunday services (during communist times this figure was even higher). Other 
religious beliefs are associated with ethnic minorities (Protestantism with the 
German minority and Orthodoxy with Belarusians and Ukrainians). In the mid-
1980s  movements  referring  to  New  Born  Christians  began  to  emerge  and 
become more  popular,  especially  among young people.  A state-inspired  and 
sanctioned PAX movement created to oppose Catholic intellectuals led by a pre-
war  right  wing  politician,  Bolesław Piasecki,  it  received  little  attention  and 
support as the Church maintained its independence.
The  structures  of  the  Catholic  Church  resisted  the  policies  of  the 
authorities. After the imprisonment of the cardinal of Poland, Stefan Wyszyński, 
from 1952-55, relations began to become less drastic as did state repression. In 
1966,  the  Catholic  Church  in  Poland  celebrated  a  millennium  since  the 
Christianization11 of  Poland  and  the  authorities  celebrated  the  1000th 
anniversary of Polish statehood. The election of cardinal Karol Wojtyła as the 
new pope John Paul II in 1978 gave the Catholic Church in Poland a powerful 
ally  in  the  international  forum.  His  visits  in  1979,  1983  and  1987  were 
manifestations not only of religious belief, but also of political opposition to the 
regime.
The Catholic  Church,  opposing the  official  atheism of  the  communist 
party, framed its actions in contrast with state ideology, avoiding open and harsh 
conflicts. It also supported the opposition that intensified in the late 1970s. The 
stereotype of a true Pole-Catholic was used in contrast to the new man of the 
socialist  age  and  the  Catholic  faith  was  linked  to  independence  struggles. 
References to Polish messianic  traditions (particularly lively in the romantic 
period)  were  also  made.  The  Church  was  regarded  as  a  stable  institution 
defending the people, and more and more leaders of the opposition publicly and 
openly declared their Catholicism.
Attendance  at  religious  services  was  a  manifestation  of  one’s  attitude 
towards the communist system – party members were discouraged from taking 
part in religious celebrations.  A new and paradoxical category of ‘practicing 
elected on individual basis.
11 In 966 the first ruler of Poland – Mieszko I – was baptised and Christianity was adopted in Poland.
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nonbelievers’ emerged. Some services were held for the motherland and some 
priests (Jankowski, Popiełuszko) openly supported the Solidarność movement. 
The Church also struggled with the administration for the right to build new 
churches, organize pilgrimages and nominate chaplains to the army (to replace 
the officers responsible for ‘political education’).
International NGOs
NGOs were legally allowed to function in Poland only from 1988 onwards. This 
sector  developed  in  the  early  1990s,  when  new forms  of  financing  became 
available.  Much of  the  support  came from the outside,  whether  financial  or 
material aid or providing good coverage of dissidents’ struggles. 
Before the transition INGOs offered scholarships to Polish dissidents as 
well  as  providing  them  with  the  necessary  know-how  (in  particular  the 
environmental groups). Worldwide struggles for human rights (i.e. by Amnesty 
International) also had an indirect impact on the Polish case. One of the most 
active  organizations  was  the  Polish-Czech-Slovak  Solidarity  [Solidarność 
Polsko-Czesko-Słowacka]  established  by  KOR,  Solidarność  and  Charter  77 
activists  in  Prague  in  October  1981.  After  martial  law  the  group  resumed 
underground cooperation in 1982.
The  approach  of  the  INGOs  tended  towards  considering  Poland  an 
underdeveloped country, similar to the Third World countries that needed help 
and assistance. Much of this help was designed to train future local leaders, in 
particular in environmental protection and the human rights agenda. The Polish-
Czech-Slovak Solidarity also concentrated on the exchange of experiences of 
various  anti-regime  activities  and  actions  and  on  the  translations  of  texts 
important for the dissidents. In the late 1980s solidarity actions for the release of 
dissidents (mostly in Czechoslovakia) were organized. Comparisons with other 
pro-democratic movements were also made, in particular with the anti-apartheid 
struggles in South Africa, in order to make a comparison with the oppressive 
side of the communist regime clear to other audiences.
Since  the  mid-1980s a  network of  Green organizations  –  Greenway - 
began to develop under the auspices of Dutch activists who taught the Central 
European activists about issues connected to environmental protection as well 
as new tactics. This allowed them to organize trans-border protests, for instance 
in the case of the Stonava (now in the Czech Republic) cement factory.
Most of the help from INGOs was in the form of material aid, especially 
to  allow the  dissidents  to  continue  their  publication  work.  Paper,  paint  and 
printing presses were smuggled into Poland. Lots of charity goods were sent to 
Poland and distributed mostly through the Church. Many of the employees of 
the INGOs wrote articles for the press in their home countries, presenting the 
struggles of the dissidents and everyday life.
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Conclusion
The  year  1989  is  central  for  the  Polish  transition  from  communism  to 
democracy. However, contrary to some popular beliefs, the events of 1989 can 
hardly be called a revolution. As Padraic Kenney writes: “Over the years the 
term 'revolution'  starts  to  disappear.  Even  in  Central  Europe  one  speaks  of 
'transformation',  'transition'  or  simply  'year  1989'”  (Kenney  2005:  27).  The 
changes of 1989 could not have taken place without the events of a decade 
earlier: the rise of Solidarność in 1980 and the introduction of martial law in 
1989.  The  defeat  of  the  opposition  had  many  consequences,  primarily  that 
people  were  –  initially  –  scared  of  further  confrontations  with  the  regime. 
Stanislaw Handzlik,  a  high-ranking  Solidarność  activist,  asked  [by  Kenney] 
whether he was afraid that  the Communists could again respond with tanks, 
curfews and mass detentions under the guise of national defense, answered, 'No 
- you can just scare people once. Once again, it would be simply ridiculous'12. 
In the mid-1980s people were in fact becoming less and less afraid and 
began to act as in the 1970s: openly, using legal methods, and peacefully. This 
way of acting also opened up a window of opportunity for many new groups, 
mostly youth groups, to emerge: students, high school pupils, environmentalists, 
pacifists, anarchists and so forth. Many of the activists could be characterized 
by “'internalized pluralism' - combining and mixing the issues of identity and, 
depending on your needs,  or that  which served to combat communism. One 
could meet species such as nationalist pacifists or pro-market Greens” (Kenney 
2005: 25). Many of the social activists were also much more radical (in their 
claims but  also in the tactics  they used) than the dissidents.  The scene was 
overtaken by crowds of radical environmentalists,  hippies, artists,  performers 
and pacifists -  often mingling threads of anarchism, liberalism, conservatism 
and postmaterialism in an original way (although all of these ideologies meant 
something different to a Central European country as compared to the West). 
(Kenney 2005: 13)
Many  of  the  campaigns  sustained  by  social  movement  activists  were 
continued after regime change: against the nuclear power plant in Żarnowiec 
(and  also  in  Klempicz),  against  compulsory  military  service,  for  the 
environment.  However,  without  a  clearly  defined  enemy  (such  as  the 
communists) their activities became weaker and weaker.
The transformation process was not merely a political one, but also had 
social consequences. With the declining repressive capacity of the communist 
regime (the amnesty for political prisoners and the everyday practices of the 
police forces) numerous grassroots groups emerged. Many were connected to 
youth subcultures and countercultures, adding to the broad spectrum of political 
opposition  in  Poland in the 1980s.  The mainstream opposition  – mostly  the 
12   Padraic Kenney, Young Workers Fuel Solidarity, “The Boston Globe”, 4 September 1988.
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Solidarność  movement  –  that  opted  for  a  compromise  with  the  authorities 
sparked the development of many groups that were more radical in terms of 
repertoires  of  contention  and  claims.  Many  of  these  groups  were  the 
predecessors of today’s social movements in Poland.
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